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Developing a multitask principal-agent model, this paper theoretically analyzes the 
incentive provisions in the existing cattle feeding contracts under alternative fed cattle 
pricing methods. Comparative statics from the theoretical model are evaluated by 
simulation experiments. Feedlot and carcass performance of a large set of feeder steers 
are simulated employing a dynamic and deterministic bio-physical growth model adapted 
from the animal science literature. The cattle feeder and the owner’s stochastic costs and 
returns under alternative production technologies and market conditions are then 
calculated by combining cattle performance data with historical price data. The main 
finding of this study is that the yardage fee contract is optimal for the cattle owner when 
the fed cattle are to be priced on the grid and the cost of gain contract is optimal when the 
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  1Optimal Incentive Structure in Cattle Feeding Contracts under Alternative Fed 
Cattle Pricing Methods 
 




In order to meet increasing consumer concern about the quality and consistency of 
beef products beef industry participants have adopted a variety of alternative production 
and marketing practices. A recent survey of cattle feeders suggests that traditional lot 
average pricing methods for fed cattle, such as live weight and dressed weight pricing, 
are being replaced over time by individual carcass value based pricing methods 
(Schroeder et al, 2002). While adoption of such value based pricing of fed cattle is likely 
to induce significant changes in the production practices and organizational structure 
along the beef supply chain, this study attempts to analyze the optimal incentive structure 
in contract cattle feeding under alternative fed cattle pricing methods.  
Several previous studies identify the source of price and production risks in cattle 
feeding (Mark, Schroeder, and Jones, 2000; Albright, Schroeder and Langemeire, 1994; 
Schroeder et al., 1993; Langemeire, Schroeder, and Mintert, 1992; and Trapp and 
Cleveland, 1989). All of these studies report that fed cattle, feeder cattle, and corn prices 
are the largest contributors to cattle feeding profit variability, while production risk 
accounts for a small share. However, none of these studies evaluate the risks and returns 
to feedlot operators and cattle owners that occur with alternative types of custom cattle 
  2feeding contracts. Weimer and Hallam (1990) analyze the risk and returns associated 
with three types of custom cattle feeding contracts. Combining historical price data with 
seasonal cattle performance data, they find that custom cattle feeders and cattle owners 
face differing risk and return levels depending on the season that feeder cattle are placed 
on feed. Comparing stochastic returns to feedlot operators and cattle owners under 
alternative contract types, Weimer and Hallam show that cattle feeders are significantly 
better off with yardage fee contracts as opposed to cost of gain contracts, whereas cattle 
owners are only slightly better off with guaranteed cost of gain contracts.  
In order to calculate cattle owners’ returns from cattle feeding, Weimer and 
Hallam (1990) considered only the live weight prices of fed cattle. Since the incentive 
structures in the alternative fed cattle pricing methods are different, it is conceivable that 
a cattle owner would choose a particular payment scheme for cattle feeding that aligns 
her objective to that of the feeder. The purpose of this article is to examine if the cattle 
owners’ optimal choice of cattle feeding contracts are different under alternative fed 
cattle marketing methods. In particular, the objective of this study is to theoretically 
analyze and empirically evaluate the incentive provisions in existing cattle feeding 
contracts under three alternative fed cattle pricing methods: live weight, dressed weight, 
and grid pricing.  
The next section of this paper presents a brief description of the existing fed cattle 
pricing methods and cattle feeding contracts in the United States. A discussion about the 
implications of value based pricing of fed cattle on contract cattle feeding arrangements 
is also presented in this section. The incentive structure of alternative pricing methods 
and feeding contracts are analyzed employing a principal-agent framework. A multitask 
  3principal-agent model is developed and presented in section three. The predictions of the 
theoretical model are evaluated by simulation experiments. Section four describes the 
simulation procedures and results. Finally, section five provides a summary of the paper 
and implications of further research. A dynamic and deterministic bio-physical growth 
model adapted to simulate cattle performance is described in the Appendix with detailed 
description of the variables, equations used in the model, and step by step simulation 
procedures.   
 
2. Alternative Fed Cattle Pricing Methods and Cattle Feeding Contracts 
Over the last two decades beef consumption in the United States has declined 
steadily both in terms of aggregate quantity and as a share of total U. S. meat 
consumption (Hueth and Lawrence, 2003). On the other hand, pork and chicken 
consumption has increased significantly during the same period due primarily to 
reduction in their prices relative to beef and increased consumer concerns regarding the 
consumption of red meat (Hueth and Lawrence, 2003). Relative improvements in the 
quality and consistency of pork and chicken products are also cited as important 
contributing factors (Purcell, 2000; Schroeder et al., 2000). Researchers argue that 
coordination among the vertical sectors is behind this success of the broiler and hog 
industries (Hayenga et al. 2000). The broiler industry is entirely vertically coordinated 
through ownership or contracts and the hog industry appears to be following a similar 
course (Hayenga et al., 2000). The beef industry has lagged behind the broiler and hog 
industries in adopting vertical coordination mechanisms. Still three-fourths of feeder and 
fed cattle are sold through livestock auctions on a cash basis (USDA). However, in an 
  4apparent attempt to improve beef quality and increase overall profits, the beef industry 
participants have developed a variety of novel production and marketing practices during 
the last decade. Individual cattle management systems (ICMS), grid pricing, formula 
pricing, short- and long-term marketing agreements, and strategic alliances are examples 
of some newly adopted practices.
2 Grid pricing of fed cattle has become the most popular 
among the new marketing practices.   
Historically, most fed cattle had been sold at terminal auction markets on a live 
weight basis. The main disadvantage to live weight pricing is that it is based on lot 
averages; all cattle in a pen receive the same price regardless of the quality of the 
individual animals and the yield of the carcasses. An alternative pricing method, dressed 
weight pricing (in-the-beef), values fed cattle on the basis of carcass-weight that rewards 
higher yielding cattle. However, there is no price differential for quality in dressed weight 
pricing. While dressed weight pricing compensates for higher yield (amount of lean meat, 
fat, and bone in the carcass) using the exact dressing percentage, it does not take account 
of differences in carcass quality (marbling, lean color, and firmness and texture of lean 
tissue). Unlike live weight and dressed weight pricing, under grid pricing method each 
individual carcass is priced on the basis of actual dressed weight with premiums and 
discounts for various carcass traits. Most grids consist of a base price with specified 
premiums and discounts for quality and yield grades.  
In general, higher quality cattle receive higher prices and lower quality cattle 
receive lower prices in the grid, thereby improving pricing accuracy and rewarding 
                                                 
2 Grid pricing is a common mechanism in nearly all of the alliances. Alliances are a type of organization 
where different individuals and companies from different sectors of the beef industry operate somewhat 
independently of one another but still share in risks and profits through contractual arrangements (Field and 
Taylor, 2002). 
 
  5cattlemen who market desirable types of cattle. Thus, grid pricing mechanism offers cow-
calf producers a new opportunity to recoup their costly investment in genetics and 
increase their profits by retaining ownership of the cattle until they are ready for 
slaughter. However, by retaining ownership of the cattle beyond weaning, producers may 
also assume substantial price, production, and holdup risks.
3 While cow-calf producers 
are unable to influence the stochastic parts of price and animal performance, profitability 
of retaining ownership crucially depends on the management practices adopted by the 
cattle feeder. For example, daily weight gain and composition of the gain substantially 
depends on energy and protein values of the ration provided to the cattle, the use of feed 
additives, and application growth promoting implants during the feeding phase.  
Cow-calf producers who retain ownership of their cattle until slaughter typically 
place weaned calves in commercial feedlots for intensive feeding. Feeding cattle in a 
commercial feedlot allows the cow-calf owner to take advantage of the expertise of the 
feedlot operator, facilities, and equipments, which improve feeding efficiency and gain 
economies of scale through the feedlot operator’s ability to spread fixed costs over larger 
numbers of animals. However, commercial cattle feeding typically involve contractual 
arrangements (both formal and informal) between the cattle owner and the feedlot 
operator. A formal cattle feeding contract between a cow-calf producer and a commercial 
feedlot operator makes provisions for delivery, handling, and feeding of the cattle, 
payments for services or division of profits, and marketing the livestock. Existing cattle 
                                                 
3 Price roll-backs are of particular concern as the value per hundredweight (cwt.) of live beef decreases as 
the weight of the animals increases. Cow-calf producers assume additional production risk (animal 
performance risk) and holdup risk (due to potential opportunistic behavior of feedlot operators) by retaining 
ownership of the cattle through an additional production stage. Death loss during the backgrounding and 
finishing stage can have significant impacts on profitability. Finally, cash flow for the producers is strained 
with retained ownership, especially in the first year. 
  6feeding contracts can be classified into two major types: feed cost plus yardage fee 
contracts (yardage fee contract hereafter) and flat rate per pound of gain contracts (cost of 
gain contract hereafter). These contracts mainly differ in the method of payment for the 
services or the rules of sharing revenues and costs.  
Under the yardage fee contract, payment to the feeder is based on a fixed charge 
per day per animal plus reimbursement for the amount of feed consumed, with other costs 
such as veterinary and labor costs being built into the yardage charge.
4 Under the cost of 
gain contract on the other hand, the feeder provides all inputs except the feeder cattle and 
is reimbursed on the basis of a negotiated price per pound of gain put on the livestock 
weight. The price per pound of gain is determined prior to feed the cattle and is usually 
based on feed costs, costs of equipment and overhead, death loss, and shrink involved.
5
According to the literature on incentives, the yardage fee contract can be termed 
as a very low powered incentive contract and the cost of gain contract can be termed as a 
very high powered one. Although individual carcasses are priced according to actual 
yield and quality on the grid, none of the cattle feeding contracts provide incentive for 
superior quality. The cost of gain contract is designed to provide incentive for higher 
yield only, while the yardage fee contract does not offer any incentive at all. The reason 
for the absence of incentive for quality is that beef quality can not be measured before 
slaughter. However, as long as there is a concern for beef quality, a cattle feeder has at 
least two major tasks to perform: add weights at a faster rate and maintain higher quality. 
                                                 
4 A variant of the yardage fee contract is the feed markup contract. This contract involves a smaller yardage 
fee per animal per day but includes a percentage markup on feed costs. 
 
5 Sometimes a sliding scale is used as another method of payment. In this method, the payment is based on 
per hundred pounds of gain for different weights. Typically the payment increases with successive gain as 
the weight of the animal increases at a decreasing rate while under continuous feeding. An example is that 
the owner pays the feeder for the first 100 pounds of gain $16, for the second 100 pounds $17, for the third 
hundred pounds $20, and for the fourth hundred pounds $24 (Madsen, 1996). 
  7Depending on the degree of substitutability (or complementarity) between these two 
tasks, the feeder’s optimal actions may vary under alternative contracts with different 
incentive structures which in turn affect potential yield and quality of beef. Knowing this 
information, a cattle owner would offer a particular payment scheme for cattle feeding 
that aligns her objective to that of the feeder.  
The quality of beef depends primarily on three palatability attributes: tenderness, 
flavor, and juiciness. Flecks of intramuscular fat (termed as marbling) distributed in 
muscle tissue has a positive relationship to all the three attributes of beef palatability 
(Field and Taylor, 2002). Therefore, the higher the marbling the palatable the beef is. 
Scientific research shows that different breeds of cattle vary in muscle fiber color which 
is related to the ability to deposit marbling. Thus, breed is the primary determinant of 
beef quality. However, nutrition and health management program at the ranch and feedlot 
also alter intra-muscular fat deposition. In particular, the nutrition program for the calves 
during the weaning stage determines the initial marbling of the animals, while feeding 
and health management practices adopted by the feedlot operator during the feeding stage 
affect the rate of animal weight gain, feed efficiency, and final marbling. For example, 
feeding high-grain ration during the finishing stage increases marbling thus improving 
beef quality. On the other hand, the use of growth promoting implants increases average 
daily gain and feed efficiency, but it has a negative impact on marbling.
6 These two 
activities of the cattle feeder can be regarded as substitutes, at least in affecting the final 
quality of beef.  
                                                 
6 According to Field and Taylor (2002), the aggressive use of high-potency implants may yield undesirable 
effects on quality of beef in terms of tenderness and marbling. Use of implants during the weaning stage 
affects weight gain and quality of beef in a similar way.   
  8A cattle feeder chooses the composition of ration and implant strategy that 
minimize the cost of feeding (or that maximizes his profit from feeding). However, the 
cattle feeder’s optimal feeding and implant strategy may not be beneficial for the cattle 
owner, especially when the owner sells fed cattle through grid pricing mechanism. The 
problem aggravates when the cattle are fed according to a cost of gain contract that offers 
incentive for faster gain but not for beef quality. The multiple task principal-agent theory 
of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) suggests that, when there are multiple tasks the 
incentive structure of the contract not only allocates risks but also serves to direct the 
allocation of the agent’s attention among their various duties. In particular, the theory 
implies that, if the tasks are not separable and the agent’s performance in one task is easy 
to measure but not in the others then a payment scheme with incentive for the first task 
only may lead the agent to allocate full attention towards that one and ignore the others. 
Thus, when beef yield is easy to measure but the quality is not, then the cost of gain 
contract may lead the feeder to increase beef yield at the expense of quality. Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1991) further suggest that, when activities for multiple tasks are 
substitutes, incentive for any given activity can be provided either by rewarding that 
activity or by reducing the incentive for the other activities. Therefore, according to the 
multitask principal-agent theory, the yardage fee contract is optimal for the cattle owner’s 
as long as the owner is concerned about the final quality of beef to be produced.  
 
3. A Multitask Model for Cattle Feeding Contracts 
  A multitask principal agent model is developed to analyze the optimal incentive 
structure in cattle feeding contracts under alternative fed cattle pricing methods. This is a 
  9modified version of the one developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) that is tailored 
to capture the incentive provisions in fed cattle pricing methods and payment schemes in 
cattle feeding contracts. While Holmstrom and Milgrom consider complementarities only 
in the agent’s private cost function, complementarities among the same variables both in 
the production and cost functions are considered in the following model.  
Consider a principal agent relationship in which a risk neutral cattle owner (the 
principal hereafter) who owns feeder cattle and makes contractual arrangements with a 
risk averse feedlot operator (the agent hereafter) to feed the cattle until they are ready for 
slaughter. After choosing a particular payment scheme from a menu of contracts, the 
principal delivers the cattle to the agent’s premise on an agreed date. The agent feeds the 
cattle high-energy rations until they are ready for slaughter. When the cattle gain desired 
weight, the principal makes payment to the agent for feeding the cattle according the 
contract and earns revenue by selling the fed cattle to a beef packer. The sequence of 
actions of the principal and the agent is outlined in figure 1.   
 
The principal 
chooses the  The agent 
terms of the  chooses the  the fed cattle
contract actions and earns revenue
Feeding is completed
The principal sells 
Feeding
Figure 1. Sequence of Actions
The principal takes
control of the cattle
upon compensation
0 t 1 t 2 t 3 t
) , ( 2 1 a a
 
 
Assume that the entire process has four time periods. At period  , the principal 
chooses a payment scheme from the menu of cattle feeding contracts and offers it to the 
0 t
  10agent. Attention is limited to only linear contracts with fixed fee and incentives based on 
the full vector of contractible variables.
7 If the agent accepts the terms of the contract, the 
principal delivers the cattle to the feedlot at period  . The agent then starts feeding the 
cattle by choosing a two-element vector of actions 
1 t
) , ( 2 1 a a a =  at cost  per 
hundred pounds of live weight gain. The feedlot operator’s actions   and   primarily 
affect yield   and quality   of the beef procured from each hundred pounds of live 
weight. Assuming a linear functional form, the relationship between agent’s actions and 
actual yield and quality of beef can be written as: 
) , ( 2 1 a a c
1 a 2 a
y q
2 12 1 11 0 0 a m a m y y y y + + = Δ + =       
  2 22 1 21 0 0 a m a m q q q q + + = Δ + =         
a M l l + = 0           ( 1 )  
where l is a vector of actual yield and quality of beef in each hundred pounds of live 
weight,   is a vector of   and  which are threshold levels of yield and quality which 
are not affected by the feedlot operator’s actions, and 
0 l 0 y 0 q
y Δ and  q Δ are incremental yield 
and quality of beef which exclusively depend on the actions of the cattle feeder’s action 
during the feeding phase.
8 Parameters   with  ij m } 2 , 1 { , ∈ j i  in matrix M  represent 
coefficients of production corresponding to the actions of the feedlot operator.  
The linear production functions represented by equations in (1) nests two standard 
cases. First, one dimensional efforts ( 0 22 12 = = m m ), where attempts to improve yield 
                                                 
7 A theoretical justification for the use of linear contracts could be found in Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1987) and Bhattacharyya and Laffontain (1995).  
8 Assuming that the production functions are additively linear, it allows us to separately consider the effects 
of the cow-calf producer and the feedlot operator’s actions on beef yield and quality in successive 
production stages.  
  11also increases the quality of beef. Second, unproductive multitasking ( ), 
where attempt to increase yield is costly but does not affect the quality of beef, and vice 
versa. The agent’s actions   and   are assumed to be yield and quality improving, 
respectively, such that the elements   with 
0 21 12 = = m m
1 a 2 a
ii m } 2 , 1 { ∈ i are positive. The off-diagonal 
element   with  ij m j i ≠  of the coefficient matrix,M , is a measure of systematic 
complementarity (or substitutability in case the sign is negative) between the actions in 
the production function. For analytical simplicity, I assume that M  is symmetric and 
positive definite.      
The cost function  is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, 
strictly increasing, strictly convex in both of its arguments, and is represented by a 
quadratic function of the form  





























=      (2) 
where, the off-diagonal element   with  ij c j i ≠  in the symmetric matrix Cis a measure of 
the degree of effort substitutability (or complementarity in case the sign is negative).  
At period  , the cattle reaches desired weight and the principal resumes the 
control of the fed cattle upon making payment to the agent for cattle feeding according to 
the linear incentive contract chosen at period  . The actions of the cattle feeder during 
the feeding phase are not directly observable or verifiable by the principal. Neither does 
she observes the final yield and quality of beef upon delivery of the fed cattle. However, 
the owner observes the additional weight gained by the cattle during the feeding period 
and the number of days the cattle were on feed. Based on these information and also on 
2 t
0 t
  12some other objective or subjective measures, the principal makes an assessment of 
potential yield and quality of beef. It should be noted that while there is an objective 
measure of potential yield, the measurement of beef quality is very subjective.  
Let the measures of incremental yield and quality be linear functions of the 
agent’s actions and are given by  
1 2 12 1 11 0 1 2 1 ) , ( ε ε + + + = + = a m a m y a a f sy  
2 2 22 1 21 0 2 2 1 ) , ( ε ε + + + = + = a m a m q a a g sq  
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where is a vector of measured yield and quality   and  respectively) of beef 
obtained from hundred pounds of live weight, and 
S y s ( q s
ε  is a vector of random variables that 
have a bivariate normal distribution. The variance  ii σ  of the random variable  i ε  is a 
measure of both the difficulty that the agent has in controlling yield and quality of beef 
and the difficulty that the principal has in measuring the output, or in observing the 
actions of the agent. The covariance between the  i ε  and  j ε ,  ij σ  is a measure of random 
complementarity (or substitutability) between the actions of the agent.  
According to the linear compensation scheme, the agent receives a fixed fee per 
hundred pounds of live weight gain, α , (that covers feed cost and yardage charges for 
each hundred pound of live weight gain), and incentives,  1 β  and  2 β , for incremental 
yield and quality per hundred pounds of added weight. Thus the agent’s net income per 
hundred pounds of live weight gain,x, is   
[ ] ε β α β α + + + = + = a M l S a a x
T T
0 2 1 ) , (      (4) 
  13Feed cost plus yardage fee and flat-rate-per-pound-of-gain are two special cases of the 
linear payment scheme in equation (4). Equation (4) represents feed cost plus yardage fee 
contract when 0 1 = β  and  0 2 = β , and flat-rate-per-pound-of-gain contract when  0 = α  
and  0 2 = β .  
Let the agent’s total income from cattle feeding is given by  kx X = , where   is 
the number of hundred pounds of meat (the scale of operation) the feedlot is able to 
produce in the short run. Denoting the agent’s constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
coefficient by 
k
φ  and constant relative risk aversion coefficient by ψ , the risk preference 
of the agent can be represented by a negative exponential utility function of the form 
) exp( ) ( x X U ψ − − = , where  k x x E φ ψ ψ ψ = = = / ) / ( .
9 Thus, the agent’s certainty 
equivalent income per hundred pound of weight gain is given by  
  β β
ψ
β α Σ − − + + =
T
T
T a C a
a M l ACE
2 2
] [ 0        (5) 
The last term in equation (5) is the variance of the agent’s income under the linear 
compensation scheme. Thus, the feedlot owner’s certainty equivalent income is his 
expected compensation from the linear payment scheme, minus the private cost of the 
agent’s actions, minus a risk premium.  
Finally, at period  , the principal sells fed cattle to a packer and realizes revenue. 
The principal can sell the fed cattle either through open outcry livestock actions on a live 
weight basis where the packers are bidders, or sell them to an individual packer using a 
dressed weight or a grid pricing method through some kind of marketing agreement. Live 
3 t
                                                 
9 This framework takes account of the effect of the scale of operation on the agent’s risk preference. In 
particular, it implies that the agent follow CARA in the short run but adapt to CRRA over the longer run as 
scale  changes.   ) (k
  14weight pricing of fed cattle can be regarded as an outside option for the producer, as this 
is still the predominant method of marketing fed cattle. In any case, packers value both 
the quality and quantity of beef procured from the animals, which in turn depend on the 
actions taken by agent during the feeding phase.  
When the fed cattle are priced on a grid, the packer pays a base price for the 
benchmark yield and quality combination, plus premiums (or discounts) for actual  
incremental yield and quality. Let B  denote the base payment for yield and quality 
combination   and   per hundred pounds of live weight,   be the price premium for 
the incremental yield  , and   be the premium for the incremental quality  . Thus, 
when the cattle are priced on a grid, the principal’s income per hundred pounds live 
weight is  
0 y 0 q 1 p






















p p B a M p B
T       
The grid price mechanism above nests the other two pricing methods. When there is no 
premium for beef quality (i.e., when  0 2 = p ) it represents dressed weight pricing, and 
when there is no premium at all (i.e.,  0 1 = p  and  0 2 = p ) it represents live weight price. 
Assuming that the principal is risk neutral, her certainty equivalent net income is her 
expected revenue minus expected payment to the agent under a linear compensation 
scheme. 
       (6)  ] [ 0 a M l a M p B S a M p B PCE
T T T T + − − + = − − + = β α β α
The efficient incentive contracts are those that maximize the joint surplus of the 
principal and the agent subject to the agent’s incentive constraint. The joint surplus is the 
  15total certainty equivalent of the principal and the agent under grid pricing of fed cattle 
and the linear compensation rule for cattle feeding  
 
2 2
β β ψ Σ
− − + = + =
T T
T a C a
a M p B PCE ACE TCE .    (7) 
The expression in equation (7) is independent of the intercept term α . The principal 
chooses a and β  to maximize the total certainty equivalent, and then uses α  to transfer 
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a M k a
T
T β α  
The incentive constraint states that, for any given β , the agent chooses the level 
of   and   that maximizes his expected net income. From the first order condition of 
the agent’s maximization problem we have 
1 a 2 a
β M C a
1 − ∗ =           ( 8 )  
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  16Given that (  and ), the sign of  , , , 11 22 11 c m m 0 22 > c i i a β ∂ ∂ / f o r   } 2 , 1 { ∈ i is non-negative 
and the sign of  j i a β ∂ ∂ /  for  j i ≠  is non-positive if  0 12 ≤ m  and   (the signs are 
strictly positive and strictly negative for strict inequality in the sufficient conditions). In 
other words, when the actions are substitutes in the production function (i.e., ) 
and also in the agent’s cost function (i.e., ), the agent chooses an action  , 
, that increases with 
0 12 ≥ c
0 12 ≤ m
0 12 ≥ c i a
} 2 , 1 { ∈ i i β  and decreases with  j β ,  j i ≠ . Similarly, the signs of 
i i a β ∂ ∂ / f o r    and  } 2 , 1 { ∈ i j i a β ∂ ∂ /  for  j i ≠  are non-negative (positive with strict 
inequality in the sufficient conditions) if the actions are complements in the production 
and cost function (i.e., if  , and  0 12 ≥ m 0 12 ≤ c ).  
  Substituting equation (8) into the objective function, the principal’s problem can 













M MC p B Maximize . 
Assuming that  , the optimal value of  0 >
∗ a β  can be computed from first order 
necessary conditions for this unconstrained maximization problem as 
  [] p M CM M
1 1 − − ∗ Σ + = ψ β         ( 9 )  
where   is the optimal incentive contract. It is useful to examine special cases in order 
to understand the implications of the structure of the optimal contract in (9).  
∗ β
 
No uncertainty or risk neutrality 
In the case of certainty ( 0 = Σ ) or if the agent is also risk neutral ( ) like the 
principal, (9) reduces to  
0 = r
  17p =
∗ β .           ( 1 0 )  
This implies that the principal transfers the yield and quality premiums earned in the grid 
directly to the agent. If the fed cattle are sold according to dressed weight, the principal 
transfers only the yield premium, as under the dressed weight pricing method 
0 2 2 = = p β . Under the live weight pricing method 0 2 1 = = p p , which implies that 
0 2 1 = = β β . However, the principal can extract a part (or the whole) of the transferred 
premiums (in the case fed cattle are priced in a grid or according to dressed weight) from 
the agent through the use of α . Thus, the special case with no uncertainty or risk 
neutrality is a standard transfer pricing problem.  
 
The agent’s activities are unrelated (no multitasking) 
When the agent’s actions are systematically and stochastically unrelated (i.e., 












∗          ( 1 1 )  
Thus, when the agent’s activities are unrelated, the optimal incentive for the  th task is 
independent of the characteristics of the 
i
j th activity. Moreover, the principal offers a 
higher powered incentive to the agent when the premium goes up (i.e.,   is larger), and 
when the production function is more elastic with respect to the agent’s action 
(0
i p
/ > ∂ ∂ ii i m β ). On the other hand, the principal gives lower powered incentives for a 
particular task when the agent is more risk averse (i.e., r is larger), when uncertainty is 
  18higher (i.e.,  ii σ  is larger), and when the cost function is more convex (?) (i.e.,   is 
larger).  
ii c
The agent’s activities may not be independent and the signal for beef quality is 
unobservable to the principal before slaughter 
This case is tailored to fit the aspects of commercial cattle feeding and fed cattle 
pricing methods. In reality, the agent’s actions to improve yield and quality of beef are 
not independent ( ). For example, while use of growth promoting implants 
increases yield, the rate of weight gain, and feed efficiency, it also has potential negative 
effects on beef quality (Field and Taylor, 2002; Duckett, et al., 1996). On the other hand, 
a common practice to increase beef quality is to feed high grain rations during the 
finishing phase, which increases the percentage of fat in the carcass. As a result, marbling 
(intramuscular fat), and hence beef quality increases, but at the cost of yield (Fox and 
Black, 1992). This tradeoff is particularly important when the fed cattle are priced on a 
grid according to actual yield and quality of beef. Another important issue for the 
principal is that actual quality of beef is almost unobservable and immeasurable until the 
cattle are slaughtered. Therefore, in reality, we do not observe any cattle feeding 
contracts offering incentive for beef quality (
0 , 0 12 12 ≠ ≠ c m
0 2 = β ).  
In the case where the agent performs multiple tasks ( 0 , 0 12 12 ≠ ≠ c m ), and the 
quality of beef is immeasurable upon delivery of the fed cattle (or the signal of beef 
quality,  , is unobservable to the principal), such that   is infinite and  q s
2
2 σ 12 σ  is zero, the 
optimal incentive for yield improving activity is given by (for formal derivation, please, 
see the Appendix) 
  19) ( 2
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The main comparative statistic result that follows (12) is that, when the agent’s 
activities are substitute in the production and cost functions (i.e., when  and 
), a higher premium for actual yield leads to a higher powered incentive, and a 
higher premium for quality leads to a lower powered incentive (i.e.,  , and 
). It follows that, for all other things equal,  reaches its highest value 
when there is no premium for quality at all (
0 12 < m
0 12 > c
0 / 1 1 > ∂ ∂
∗ p β




0 2 = p ), as is the case in dressed weight 
pricing method. This implies that if the principal is predetermined to sell the fed cattle on 
a dressed weight basis, she will offer high powered incentive for yield improving activity. 
Thus, flat rate per pound of gain contract (highest powered incentive contract) for cattle 
feeding is more likely in the case the principal decided to price the fed cattle according to 
dressed weight.  
Under a grid pricing mechanism, actual yield and quality of beef are measured 
after slaughter and both are rewarded accordingly. Therefore, the incentive for yield 
improving activity is likely to be lower as long as the beef quality premium is positive 
( ) under the grid pricing of fed cattle. This result is consistent with the argument 
of Holmstrom and Milgrom that, when inputs are substitutes and one of the activities 
cannot be measured, then the only way to provide the incentive for that immeasurable 
activity is to reduce the incentive for the other (measurable or observable) activity.    
0 2 > p
Since the first term in (12) is positive and the second term is negative, it may be 
optimal for the principal to set  1 β  equal to zero (negative) provided the two terms in the 
  20numerator offset each other (the second term is greater than the first one in absolute 
value). Zero incentives can also arise in a limiting case when agents activities are perfect 
substitutes in the production function such that  22 12 11 m m m = =  and yield and quality 
premiums are equal ( ). In that case, both  2 1 p p = 0 2 = β  and  0 1 = β . This result explains 
why a majority of cattle are fed on the basis of a fixed fee (feed cost plus yardage 
charges) per animal head per day.     
The second comparative statistic result is that the effect of the degree of 
substitutability of the agent’s actions in the production and cost functions (i.e., the effects 
of  and  ) on the optimal incentive contract is ambiguous in general. However, it 
can be shown that, for  and  ,  
12 m 12 c
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12 11 c c c m c m c − + >
< σ ψ .      (13) 
In other words, the effect of substitutability in the production function can be determined 
under certain conditions. Finally, as in the case of unrelated efforts a lower powered 
incentive is associated with higher degree of risk aversion (larger r ) and increased 
uncertainty (larger  ii σ ).  
 
4. Evaluation of the Theoretical Predictions by Simulation Experiment 
  Empirical evaluation of the comparative static results require ranch to rail data on 
cattle fed under various contract arrangements along with actual costs and revenues. Such 
data, however, are proprietary in nature and therefore not available publicly. Therefore, a 
simulation model is developed and employed to evaluate the theoretical predictions. The 
basic idea of the simulation model is to generate and compare net returns to the feeder 
  21and the owner under various fed cattle pricing methods, contract types, and production 
technologies. Net returns to the feeder and the owner under alternative production and 
marketing practices are compared to determine the optimal technology and optimal 
contracts under each pricing methods. The first step in the comparative return simulation 
model is to define the structural profit functions and preferences of the cattle feeder and 
the owner under alternative payment systems and fed cattle pricing methods. Given  
  
Profit and utility functions of the cattle feeder and the owner   
  Suppose, a cow-calf producer delivers   weaned calves to a commercial feedlot 
operator for intensive feeding of the animals until they gain market weight. As described 
earlier, under the yardage fee contract, the owner pays to the feeder a fixed fee per animal 
head per day and bears all the variable cost of feeding. On the other hand, under the cost 
of gain contract, the feeder receives a piece rate per pound of weight gain and bears the 
total feeding cost. In either case, the cattle feeder’s profit can be calculated easily by 
subtracting the feeder’s share of the feeding cost from the contractual payment received 
from the owner of the animal. The cattle feeder’s partial profit from feeding each 
individual cattle can be described by the following equation that nests the profits under 
alternative payment schemes. 
k
  ,     for  ; 
    subject to,   if    
i f R i i i
F
i DOF C P FE ADG ADG × − × × × − + × + = ] ) 1 ( [ γ β α π k i ... , 1 =
0 = α , then    0 = γ ,  
    i f         0 = β , then  γ ≤ 1 , and 
     α α ≤ ≤ 0 ,   β β ≤ ≤ 0 ,  and  γ γ ≤ ≤ 0 .   (14) 
  22Where   represents the feeder’s profit from feeding cattle i, 
F
i π α  is the yardage charge 
per animal head per day, β  is the piece rate per pound of gain, γ  is the feeder’s share of 
the variable cost of feeding,   denotes price per pound of feed ration,  represents 
fixed cost per animal head per day, and  ,  , and   denotes average daily 
gain, feed efficiency, and days on feed of the animal, respectively. When 
R P f C
i ADG i FE i DOF
0 = α  
and 0 = γ , equation (14) represents the feedlot operator’s profit from feeding cattle i 
under the cost of gain contract. Alternatively, when  0 = β  and  γ ≤ 1 , it represents the 
feeder’s profit under the yardage fee contract.  
  The feeder’s profit from feeding   cattle is the sum of  over all  . Thus, the 
feeder’s average profit per head can be represented by  
k
F
















π π .          ( 1 5 )  
Total shrunk weight gain by an animal can be expressed as a product of average daily 
gain and the number of days on feed. Therefore, the feeder’s average profit per hundred 
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π π & .       ( 1 6 )  
  The cattle owner takes the possession of the fed cattle upon paying the feeder 
according to the contract and sells the cattle either in the live, dressed, or grid market. As 
mentioned earlier, the grid pricing mechanism offers premiums and discounts for 
incremental yield and quality of the beef procured from each individual animal. Under 
the dressed weight pricing method carcasses are priced according to the actual yield or 
  23dressing percentage, thus paying a premium (discount) for higher (lower) yield on an 
average. However, the base prices in the dressed weight and grid pricing methods are 
typically established with historical cash live weight prices and expected dressing 
percentage. Yield premium is just the difference between the actual and expected 
dressing percentages multiplied by the base price. Therefore, the cattle owner’s profit 
from a grid that uses cash live weight prices for establishing the base price can be 
expressed by the following equation.  
[]
100
) ( ) (
i i i




DP Q Y P DP DP P
+ ×
× × Δ × + Δ × + × − + = ρ ρ π  
 -  [] F
i
i R i i i P
ISBW
DOF P FE ADG ADG × − × × × × + × +
100
γ β α ,   for  ;  k i ... , 1 =
subject to,   if     0 = α , then    0 = γ ,  
    i f         0 = β , then  γ ≤ 1 , and 
     α α ≤ ≤ 0 ,   β β ≤ ≤ 0 ,  and  γ γ ≤ ≤ 0 ,   (17) 
where  stands for initial shrunk body weight of the feeder cattle,   and   denote 
prices of fed and feeder cattle per hundred pounds of live weight,   and   are 
actual and expected dressing percentages, 
ISBW L P F P
A DP E DP
Y
ρ and   Q ρ  represent yield and quality grade 
premiums, and   and   are incremental yield and quality grades, respectively. 
Equation (17) also nests the owner’s profits from live and dressed weight pricing of the 
cattle. In particular, when there are no yield and quality grade premiums (i.e.,  
Y Δ Q Δ
0 =
Y
ρ and  
) 0 = Q ρ , then equation (17) represents the owner’s profit from dressed weight pricing. 
When there is no premium for yield (i.e.,  ) 0 = − E A DP DP , then it represents the profit 
  24under live weight pricing. The cattle owner’s average profit per head and per hundred 
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  Following the convention of the expected utility theory, preferences of the risk 
averse cattle feeder and the owner can be represented by expected utility functions. Let 
 and   denote the total net profits of the feeder and the owner, respectively. 
Assuming constant absolute risk aversion from both of the feeder and the owner’s part, 
their utilities from the operation are given by 
F Π
O Π
 )   ;          ( 2 0 )   exp(
F F U Π − − = ϕ
 ) ;          ( 2 1 )   exp(
O O U Π − − = φ
where ϕ  and φ  are CARA coefficients of the feeder and the owner, respectively. The 
assumption of constant absolute risk aversion implies that relative risk aversion is 
increasing in scale. Arrow (1970) ahs made convincing arguments against the possibility 
of increasing relative risk aversion. The effect of scale of operation on the agents’ risk 
preference can be incorporated with an approximation of the constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) coefficients.   
Assume that the feedlot has the capacity of feeding K cattle simultaneously, and 
the full capacity of the feedlot is utilized by feeding   cattle heads from   identical 
feeder cattle owners. Thus, total net profit of the feeder is given by 
k n
F F F nk K π π = = Π . 
Denote the feeder’s constant relative risk aversion coefficient (CRRA) by ψ . Since 
  25F nkπ ϕ ψ = , the feeder’s utility from feeding k  cattle of a single owner can be 
expressed as  
) ˆ exp(
F F U π ψ − − = ,          ( 2 2 )  
where  k n n E
F F ϕ π ψ π ψ ψ = = = ˆ / ) / ( ˆ . In a similar fashion, the cattle owner’s CRRA 
preference can be represented as  
  ) ˆ exp(
O O U π θ − − = ,          ( 2 3 )  
where θ  denotes the owner’s CRRA coefficients, and  k E
O F φ π θ π θ θ = = = ˆ / ) / ( ˆ . 
Thus, both the feeder and the owner follow CARA in the short run but adapt to CRRA in 
the longer run (as scale of operation changes).  
 
Simulation procedures 
  Given the cattle performance data and price information, net returns to the feeder 
and the cattle owner can be calculated according to the profit functions as defined above. 
In the absence of actual feedlot and carcass data, a dynamic and deterministic bio-
physical growth model for beef cattle is adapted that is able to systematically predict  
daily feed intake, weight gain, and composition of the gain by each individual animal 
given feeder cattle’s genetic and biological information, net energy and protein values of 
the ration, and weather condition. A data set containing cow-calf information and partial 
feedlot and carcass performances of 1131 steers are obtained from Tri-county Steer 
Carcass Futurity (TCSCF) program. Growth performances of these steers under eighteen 
ration-implant strategies are simulated using the bio-physical model. Six alternative 
rations with known energy and protein values along with three implant strategies are 
employed. Since the steers were placed in the feedlots of southwester Iowa during 
  26October-December of 1995-98 and harvested during April-June of the following year, a 
typical Fall-Spring weather condition of southwestern Iowa is assumed. Initial and final 
body weights of the cattle, total dry matter intake and weight gain during the feedlot 
regime, final carcass weight and yield and quality grades of the carcasses are retained to 
use in the comparative returns model. A detailed description of the growth model and an 
analysis of the simulated outcomes are available in the Appendix.      
Combining the cattle performance data generated by the growth model with 
historical price data, stochastic returns under various fed cattle pricing methods, contract 
types, and production technologies are computed. Historical weekly average prices for 
fed cattle, feeder cattle, feed ingredients, and grid premiums and discounts data are 
obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Weekly weighted 
average live and dressed weight prices for fed cattle, live weight prices for feeder cattle, 
and weekly average prices for corn during January 1996 through December 1999 in Iowa 
are obtained from the Agricultural Marketing Services (AMS) of the USDA. Corn silage 
prices are calculated using corn prices assuming 34 percent dry matter content. Iowa 
prices for soybean meal and alfalfa hay were not available through the USDA. Therefore, 
weekly average prices for soybean meal in Decatur, Central Illinois, and weekly average 
prices for alfalfa hay in Kansas are obtained for the same period. Weekly average yield 
and quality grade premiums and discounts paid in the grid under voluntary price 
reporting during 1996-99 and under mandatory price reporting during 1999-current are 
also collected. Weekly average grid premiums and discounts reported under mandatory 
price reporting provision of the USDA during 2002-05 are used instead of the voluntarily 
reported ones.  
  27Following historical profitability reports of several Iowa feedlots, yardage fee and 
other fixed cost per cattle head per day are determined. During the period of 1996-99, 
average yardage fee charged by the feedlots per cattle head per day was around 25 cents. 
Labor, utility, and interest on feed are found to be 20 cents per cattle head per day. Some 
feedlots which feed cattle under the cost of gain contracts reported that the average 
charge per pound of gain to be around 45 cents. Using average daily gain and feed 
efficiency reported by TCSCF and historical feed cost data, equivalent cost of gain 
payments equivalent to the yardage fee payments of 20-35 cents are imputed with the 
increment of one cent. The cost of gain payment equivalent to 20 and 35 cents of yardage 
charge were found to be 43.3 and 48.1 cents, respectively, and each incremental cent in 
the yardage fee resulted into a 0.3 cent increment in the cost of gain payment. Therefore, 
25 and 44.9 cents are used in the simulation as the benchmark yardage fee and cost of 
gain payments, respectively.  
Stochastic costs and returns of the feeder and the owner are calculated in a Monte 
Carlo fashion using the historical weekly average prices and the feedlot budget. Since 
cattle and feed ingredient prices are likely to be correlated, the prices are drawn from the 
multivariate distribution of the data after estimating their multivariate kernel densities.
10 
Using a multivariate random draw, feeding costs under each production situation and 
returns from selling the fed cattle through live weight, dressed, weight and grid pricing 
are calculated. Net profits of the feeder and the cattle owner are then calculated according 
to the profit functions as described above. The procedure is iterated for 5,000 times for 
each individual cattle and production technologies. Finally, average net returns (over the 
                                                 
10 Using the entire sample, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests were performed on each series. The 
hypothesis of normality for each series was rejected at the 5% significant level.   
  28iterations) per head and per hundred pounds of weight gain to the feeder and the owner 
are calculated.  
 
Simulation results 
  Following the procedures as described above, two separate simulation 
experiments are carried out. In the first experiment, net returns are calculated assuming 
that the cattle are fed until they reach a target body weight. In the second experiment, net 
returns are calculated holding the number of days on feed fixed. Assuming that the agents 
decisions were optimal, final shrunk body weights and days on feed reported in the 
TCSCF data are used as the terminal conditions in the simulations experiments. Resulting 
expected profits to the feeder and the owner per hundred pounds of added weight under 
alternative production technology, cattle feeding contracts, and fed cattle pricing methods 
are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the results of the simulation experiment 1 
(with fixed terminal state), while Table 2 displays the result of the simulation experiment 
2 (with fixed terminal time).  
The feeder’s expected profits per hundred pound of added weight from the 
alternative feeding strategies under the two types of contracts are listed in columns two 
and three of the tables. Results of the both simulation experiments show that the feeder’s 
profit under the yardage fee contract decreases with the grain-silage ratio of the ration 
and the potency of the growth promoting implants. This is because days on feed (total 
shrunk weight gain) decreases (increases) with the percentage of grain in the ration and 
the productivity of the implants with fixed terminal state (with fixed terminal time). On 
the other hand, under the cost of gain contract, the feeder’s profit increases with the 
  29productivity of the implants, and decreases with the percentage of grain in the feed with 
no implant but increases with the ratio of grain in the feed with implants. This is mainly 
because the substitutability between the energy content of the ration and the productivity 
of implants (see Appendix Tables 5 and 6).
11 The pattern of changes in the expected 
profits of the cattle owner under alternative contracts can be explained with the same 
arguments.    
 
                                                 
11 The rate of decrease in required days to reach a target body weight for higher energy content of the ration 
is diminishing with the use of implants. 
  30Table 1: The feeder and the cattle owner's expected profits under alternative 
              production technologies, feeding contracts, and fed cattle pricing methods 
             (Results from simulation experiment 1 - fixed terminal state)
Feeding YF COG YF COG YF COG YF COG
Strategy $/cwt $/cwt $/cwt $/cwt $/cwt $/cwt $/cwt $/cwt
No Implant
   Ration 1 11.88 -3.30 -2.76 12.43 -5.95 9.23 -3.62 11.56
   Ration 2 11.42 -2.89 -1.87 12.43 -5.07 9.23 -2.42 11.89
   Ration 3 11.03 -2.60 -1.21 12.43 -4.40 9.23 -1.44 12.19
   Ration 4 10.68 -2.36 -0.61 12.43 -3.81 9.23 -0.62 12.42
   Ration 5 10.38 -2.18 -0.13 12.43 -3.32 9.23 0.03 12.58
   Ration 6 10.10 -2.04 0.29 12.43 -2.91 9.23 0.60 12.74
Estrogen only
   Ration 1 9.38 3.73 6.78 12.43 3.58 9.24 1.50 7.15
   Ration 2 9.07 3.80 7.16 12.43 3.97 9.24 2.15 7.42
   Ration 3 8.79 3.88 7.51 12.43 4.32 9.24 2.78 7.70
   Ration 4 8.55 3.91 7.79 12.43 4.60 9.24 3.23 7.87
   Ration 5 8.33 3.95 8.05 12.43 4.86 9.24 3.71 8.09
   Ration 6 8.13 3.95 8.25 12.43 5.06 9.24 4.11 8.29
Estrogen plus TBA
   Ration 1 8.28 6.54 10.69 12.43 7.50 9.24 0.71 2.45
   Ration 2 8.00 6.59 11.02 12.43 7.83 9.24 1.28 2.70
   Ration 3 7.76 6.65 11.33 12.43 8.14 9.24 1.84 2.94
   Ration 4 7.54 6.68 11.57 12.43 8.38 9.25 2.32 3.19
   Ration 5 7.34 6.71 11.80 12.44 8.62 9.25 2.78 3.41
   Ration 6 7.17 6.71 11.98 12.44 8.79 9.25 3.12 3.57
Feeder's Profit Owner's Pft.--LWP Owner's Pft.--DWP Owner's Pft.--GP
 
  
  31Table 2: The feeder and the cattle owner's expected profits under alternative 
              production technologies, feeding contracts, and fed cattle pricing methods 
             (Results from simulation experiment 2 - fixed terminal time)
Feeding
Strategy YF COG YF COG YF COG YF COG
$/cwt. gain$/cwt. gain$/cwt. gain$/cwt. gain$/cwt. gain$/cwt. gain$/cwt. gain$/cwt. gain
No Implant
   Ration 1 11.73 0.66 -1.49 9.59 -6.58 4.49 -20.34 -9.27
   Ration 2 11.31 0.66 -0.70 9.94 -5.51 5.14 -18.01 -7.37
   Ration 3 10.94 0.65 -0.04 10.26 -4.59 5.71 -15.59 -5.29
   Ration 4 10.62 0.56 0.47 10.53 -3.86 6.20 -13.45 -3.39
   Ration 5 10.34 0.48 0.90 10.77 -3.23 6.63 -11.47 -1.61
   Ration 6 10.10 0.34 1.22 10.98 -2.74 7.01 -9.54 0.21
Estrogen only
   Ration 1 9.77 4.46 5.93 11.24 2.19 7.50 -8.19 -2.89
   Ration 2 9.43 4.36 6.45 11.52 2.95 8.02 -5.83 -0.76
   Ration 3 9.14 4.25 6.89 11.77 3.58 8.47 -3.65 1.24
   Ration 4 8.88 4.09 7.20 11.99 4.08 8.87 -1.45 3.34
   Ration 5 8.66 3.94 7.46 12.18 4.50 9.22 0.31 5.03
   Ration 6 8.46 3.74 7.64 12.35 4.81 9.52 2.04 6.75
Estrogen plus TBA
   Ration 1 8.68 6.29 9.75 12.15 6.76 9.15 -2.66 -0.26
   Ration 2 8.39 6.17 10.18 12.40 7.40 9.62 -0.46 1.76
   Ration 3 8.13 6.04 10.54 12.62 7.93 10.02 1.76 3.84
   Ration 4 7.90 5.86 10.78 12.82 8.34 10.37 3.64 5.67
   Ration 5 7.70 5.70 10.99 12.99 8.68 10.68 5.38 7.37
   Ration 6 7.52 5.50 11.11 13.14 8.93 10.95 7.14 9.17
Feeder's Profit Owner's Pft.-LWP Owner's Pft.-DWP Owner's Pft.-GP
 
The cattle owner’s expected profit maximizing feeding contract types under the 
live weight, dressed weight, and grid pricing methods, and the feeder’s expected profit 
maximizing choice of the production technology under the yardage fee and cost of gain 
contracts can be easily determined from the tables. It should be mentioned here that under 
the yardage fee contract the cattle owner has the right to choose the technology as he pays 
for the feeding costs (feed and implant costs). The feeder bears only the fixed costs of 
  32feeding (labor and utilities) and provides the services in exchange for the fixed yardage 
fee per animal head per day. On the other hand, under the cost of gain contract, the feeder 
bears all the costs and receives a fixed payment per pound of added weight, and therefore 
chooses the production technology that maximizes his return. The cattle owner does not 
have any discretion in choosing the feeding strategy under the cost of gain contract.  
Both of the simulation experiments show that from the owner’s perspective the 
cost of gain contract is optimal when cattle are to be priced according to the live weight 
and dressed weight pricing methods. And, as the owner chooses the cost of gain contract 
to feed the cattle, the feeder finds it optimal to use high-potency implants (estrogen plus 
trenbolon acetate) and relatively lower percentage of grain in the feed. On the other hand, 
the yardage fee contract is optimal for the cattle owner when the fed cattle are to be 
priced on the grid. It also shows that a production technology with high energy feed and a 
moderate implant strategy is optimal for the owner as the cost savings from the use of the 
high-potency implant (estrogen plus Trenbolon Acetate) is not enough to cover the loss 
of revenue due to the sacrificed beef quality.  
Thus, the comparative return simulation confirms the prediction of the multitask 
model presented in section three of this paper. In particular, the simulation experiments 
also confirm that when the feeder’s actions that affect beef yield and quality are 
substitutes but the action that alters beef quality is not measurable then a lower powered 
incentive for the yield improving activity is optimal for the cattle owner if the fed cattle 
are priced according to actual yield and quality. However, if the cattle are to be priced 
according to a method that rewards higher yield only, then a higher powered incentive 
contract (e.g., cost of gain) is optimal.  
  335. Summary and Conclusion 
  This paper evaluates the optimal incentive structure in the existing cattle feeding 
contracts under alternative fed cattle pricing methods. In particular, incentive provisions 
in the yardage fee and cost gain contracts for cattle feeding are theoretically analyzed and 
evaluated considering the live weight, dressed weight, and grid pricing methods for fed 
cattle marketing. Following the seminal work of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), a 
multitask principal agent model is developed that captures the organizational details of 
beef cattle production and marketing. In the absence of a complete ranch to rail data, the 
comparative statics from the theoretical model are evaluated with simulation 
experiments. Feedlot and carcass performance of a large set of feeder steers are simulated 
employing a dynamic and deterministic bio-physical growth model adapted from the 
animal science literature. The cattle feeder and the owner’s stochastic costs and returns 
under alternative production technologies and market conditions are then calculated by 
combining cattle performance data with historical price data. The expected profit 
maximizing actions of the cattle feeder under alternative compensation schemes, and the 
cattle owner’s optimal choice of the incentive schemes under alternative fed cattle pricing 
methods are then determined by comparing the stochastic returns.  
The simulation results confirms the main comparative static result of the multitask 
model that, when the feeder’s activities are substitute in the production and cost functions 
and the action that alters beef quality is not measurable, a higher premium for actual yield 
leads to a higher powered incentive and a higher premium for quality leads to a lower 
powered incentive. In other words, the main finding of this study is that, from the cattle 
owner’s point of view, the yardage fee (zero incentive) contract is optimal when the fed 
  34cattle are to be priced on the grid and the cost of gain contract (high powered incentive 
for yield) is optimal when the cattle are to be marketed according to the live or dressed 
weight pricing methods.  
Although the finding of this research is interesting, further research is required to 
test the robustness of the result. Especially, risk preferences of the agents are yet to be 
incorporated in the simulation experiments and a complete menu of contract payments 
need to be evaluated. Moreover, since commercial cattle feeding is in practice in different 
regions of the U. S., it needs to be examined if weather pattern and crop production 
practices have any effect on the incentive provisions. The author intends to extend the 
research along this line in near future.  
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  37 Appendix 1 
The Bio-physical Growth Model for Beef Cattle 
With significant advances in understanding complex biophysical relationships and 
rapid progress in computation technology in recent years, several mathematical models 
have been developed to simulate beef cattle production system. The major goal of such 
models has been either to predict animal performance given a fixed feed resource or to 
predict feed requirements that support a fixed level of production. Lofgreen and Garrett 
(1968) first published a simple growth simulation model based on the NE system to 
compute feed requirements when performance is fixed. Fox and Black (1977a-c, 1984) 
altered the Lofgreen and Garrett model to predict performance when voluntary feed 
intake and energy content of feeds are known.  They also generalized the model to 
account for the differences in breed, mature size, growth promoting implants, and feed 
additives. Since the introduction of Fox and Black model, continuous evaluations and 
necessary modifications have been made to improve its accuracy under alternative 
management practices and production situations (Fox et al., 1988, 1992; Tylutki et al., 
1994; Perry and Fox, 1995; Fox and Tylutki, 1998). Successive beef cattle nutrition 
subcommittees of the National Research Council (NRC, 1996, 2000) have fully adopted 
the revised model after further evaluation with experimental data. The latest version of 
the model is described and documented by Fox et al. (2003).   
Using the procedures and equations as described in NRC (1996, 2000) and Fox et 
al. (2003), researchers in the department of Animal Science at Cornell University have 
developed a dynamic and mechanistic growth model with daily time step that can be 
applied in feedlots to predict growth rate, accumulated weight, days required to reach 
  38target body composition, and carcass weight and composition of individual animal 
(Tedeschi et al., 2004). The dynamic model is able to predict either average daily gain 
(ADG) when daily dry matter intake (DMI) is known or dry matter required (DMR) when 
ADG is known (Tedeschi et al., 2004). When evaluated with a large data set obtained 
from individually fed steers, the model accounted for more than 80 percent of variation in 
predicting individual animal ADG  or DMR (Tedeschi et al., 2004). The dynamic growth 
model is being applied in a computer program called Cornell Value Discovery System 
(CVDS) developed to predict performance and costs of feeding individual animals in 
group pens.  
The CVDS model, however, is applicable only when either ADG or DMI is 
observed, while both of these variables remain unknown to the cattle feeder and/or the 
cattle owner before feeding the cattle. Another limitation of the CVDS model is that it is 
unable to simultaneously predict cattle performance under alternative feeding strategies. 
For the purpose of this study, an integrated bio-physical growth model is required that is 
capable of predicting daily voluntary DMI by each individual animal and resulting gain 
and its composition under alternative production technologies. Such a model is developed 
by adapting the CVDS model with the complements of several sub-models published in 
the NRC (1996, 2000) reports and other relevant animal science research. For a wide 
range of alternative feed-implant strategies, the model can predict dry matter intake by 
each individual animal on each day on feed, resulting daily weight gain and composition, 
final weight and yield and quality grades of the carcass, and days required to reach a 
target harvest body weight or final body weight and composition for a given feeding 
period.  
  39Major independent variables of the model include cattle’s biological 
characteristics (e.g., age, sex, initial shrunk body weight, breed, frame and body 
condition scores, and hair depth), metabolizable and net energy and protein content of the 
feed, and environmental attributes (temperature, humidity, hours of sunlight, wind speed, 
mud, and hair coat).
12 In addition, the model also requires either a user input value for 
final shrunk body weight (FSBW, hereafter) at a target body fat (when the goal is to feed 
the cattle until they reach a target harvest body weight) or the length of the feeding period 
(when cattle are fed for a predetermined length of period). Definitions of the dependent 
and independent variables used in this growth model are presented in Appendix Table 1, 
and the equations used in the growth model are listed in Appendix Table 2 according to 
the order of calculation.  
 
Description of input data 
  The growth model is applied to feedlot and carcass performance of 1147 steers 
actually fed in feedlots located in southwestern Iowa through Tri-County Steer Carcass 
Futurity (TCSCF, hereafter) Cooperative. The steers were placed on feed during October-
December of 1995-98 and harvested during April-June of the following year. The TCSCF 
data set contains individual cow and calf information provided by the cow-calf producers, 
feedlot performance data recorded by the feeders, and carcass data collected from the 
packers. After careful review, 16 observations were omitted from the data set.
13  
                                                 
12 Effects of growth promoting implants and feed additives on feed intake, gain, and fat content of gain are 
incorporated through published parameter values.      
 
13 Either average daily gain or feed efficiency (feed per pound of gain) of these cattle are out of the range. 
Also, these cattle failed a preliminary run of the growth simulation model.  
 
  40Appendix Table 1: Glossery of the variables used in the growth model
Variables Description Unit
a1 Fasting heat production coefficient (0.072 for beef cattle) Mcal/kg
-0.75/day
a2 Maintenance adjustment for previous temperature Mcal/kg
-0.75/day
AdjDMI DMI adjusted for breed, body fat, and weather condition  kg/day
AdjREM REM adjusted for cold or heat stress Mcal/day
AFSBW Adjusted final shrunk body weight (at 28% bbody fat) kg
BCS Body condition score (1=emaciated, …, 9=obese)
BE Breed effect for maintenance
CETI Current month's effective etmperature index
oC
CFP Carcass fat percentage
%
CW Carcass weight kg
DMFM Dry matter available for maintenance kg/day
DMFG Dry matter available for gain kg/day
DMI Predicted dry matter intake kg/day
DMIB DMI adjustment factor for breed
DMIBF DMI adjustment factor for body fat content
DMIIMP DMI adjustment factor for the use of implant
DMIM DMI adjustment factor for mud depth in the feedlot
DMIT DMI adjustment factor for temperature
DMITNC DMI adjustment factor for temperature with night cooling
EBF Empty body fat kg
EBFP Empty body fat percentage %




EqSBW Equivalent shrunk body weight  kg
EWG Empty weight gain kg/day
FIG Fat in gain
HCCode Hair coat code (1=dry and clean, 2=some mud on lower
body, 3=wet and matted, 4=covered with wet snow or mud)
HD Hair depth cm
HE Heat production  Mcal/day
HideCode Hide depth code (1=thin, 2=average, and 3=thick)
HideME Hide depth adjustment for external insulation
HRSc Hours of sunshine in the current month Hours
HRSp Hours of sunshine in previous month Hours




LCT Lower critical temperature
oC
 
  41Appendix Table 1(continued)
Variables Description Unit
MCP Microbial crude protein
ME Dietary content of metabolizable energy Mcal/kg
MEcs Animal requirement for ME adjusted for cold stress Mcal/day
MP Dietary content of metabolizable protein g/day
MPb Digestible microbial protein
MPf Digestible undegraded feed protein
MPg metabolizable protein required for gain g/day
Mud Mud depth in the feedlot Cm
MudME  Mud adjustment factor for external insulation
NEg Dietary content of net energy for growth Mcal/kg
NEm Dietary content of net energy for maintenance Mcal/kg
NEmcs Cold stress adjustment factor for REM
NEmhs Heat stress adjustment factor for REM
NEFG Net energy available for growth after maintenance Mcal/day
NPg Net protein required for gain g/day
PEg Protein efficiency for gain
PETI Previous month's effective temperature index
PIG protein in gain
PN NEm adjustment for previous nutrition
QG Numerical quality grade
RE Retained energy Mcal/day
REM required energy for maintenance Mcal/day
RHc Current relative humidity %
RHp Previous relative humidity %
RMP Total metabolozable protein required for maintenance g/day
SA Surface area m
2
SBW Shrunk body weight kg
SRW Shrunk reference weight (478 kg at 28% body fat) kg
SWG Shrunk weight gain kg/day
Tc Current average temperature
oC
Tp Previous month's average temperature
oC
TI Tissue (internal) insulation
oC/Mcal/m
2/day
UCT Upper critical temperature 
oC
UIP Undegraded feed protein
WSc Current wind speed km/hour
WSp Previous wind speed km/hour
YG Numerical yield grade
 
  42Appendix Table 2: Equations used in the bio-physical growth model 
Eq. No. Conditions LHS
1 RHS
2
1S B W t 0.96 × LBWt
2E B W t 0.891× SBWt
3 AFSBW EFSBW + IMPEFSBW
4E q S B W t (SBWt ×SRW) / AFSBW
5A g e   ≤ 12 mos. DMIt (SBWt
0.75 × (0.2435 × NEmt - 0.0466 × NEmt
2 - 0.1128))/NEmt
Age > 12 mos. DMIt (SBWt
0.75 × (0.2435 × Nemt - 0.0466 × NEmt
2 - 0.0869))/NEmt
6E q S B W t ≥ 350 kg DMIBFt 0.7714 + 0.00196 × EqSBWt - 0.00000371 × EqSBWt
2
EqSBWt < 350 kg DMIBFt 1
7H o l s t e i n D M I B t 1.08
Holstein × British DMIBt 1.04
All other DMIBt 1
8N o  i m p l a n t D M I M P t 0.94
Estrogen DMIMPt 1
Estrogen +TBA DMIMPt 1.03
9C E T I t 27.88 - (0.456 × Tct) + (0.010754 × Tct
2) - (0.4905 × RHct) +
(0.00088 × RHct
2) + (1.1507 × (1000/3600) × WSct) -
(0.126447 × ((1000/3600) × WSct)
2) + (0.019876 × Tct × RHct) 
(0.046313 × Tct × ((1000/3600) × WSct)) + (0.4167 × HRSct)
10 DMINCt (119.62 - 0.9708 × CETIt)/100
11 Tct ≤ -20
oCD M I T t 1.16
20
oC<Tct ≤ 20




oCD M I T t ((1 - DMINCt) × 0.75 + DMINCt)/100 + 1.05
Tct >28
oCD M I T t ((1 - DMINCt) × 0.75 + DMINCt)/100 + 1
12 DMIMt 1 - 0.01 × Mudt
13 AdgDMIt DMIt × DMIBFt × DMIBt × DMIMP × DMITt
14 PNt 0.8 + (BCSt - 1) × 0.05
15 PETIt 27.88 - (0.456 × Tpt) + (0.010754 ×Tpt
2) - (0.4905 × RHpt) +
(0.00088 × RHpt
2) + (1.1507 × (1000/3600) × WSpt) -
(0.126447 × ((1000/3600) × WSpt)
2) + (0.019876 × Tpt × RHpt)
(0.046313 × Tpt × ((1000/3600) × WSpt)) + (0.4167 × HRSpt)
16 Tpt ≤ 20
oCa 2 (88.426 - 0.785 × Tpt+ 0.0116 × Tpt
2 - 77)/1000
Tpt > 20
oCa 2 (88.426 - 0.785 × PETIt + 0.0116 × PETIt
2 - 77)/1000
  43Appendix Table 2 (continued)




0.75 × ((a1 × BE × PNt)+a2)
18 SAt 0.09 × SBWt
0.67
19 REt (AdjDMIt - (REMt-1/(NEm × IF))) × NEg
20 HEt ((MEt × AdjDMIt) - REt)/SAt
21 HCCodet ≤ 2M u d M E t (1 - HCCodet - 2) × 0.2
HCCodet > 2 MudMEt (1 - HCCodet - 2) × 0.3
22 HideMEt (1 - HideCodet - 2) × 0.2
23 EIt (7.36 - (0.296× WSct) + (2.55× HDt)× MudMEt× HideMEt
24 TIt 5.25 + 0.75 × BCSt
25 INt EIt + TIt
26 LCTt 39 - (INt × HEt × 0.85)
27 LCTt > Tct MEcst SAt × (LCTt-Tct)/INt
LCTt ≤ Tct MEcst 0
28 AdjREMt REMt + (NEmt/MEt) × MEcst
29 DMFMt AdjREMt/(NEm ×IF)
30 DMFGt AdjDMIt - DMFMt
31 NEFGt DMFGt × NEg
32 NEFGt > 0 SWGt 13.91 × (EqSBWt-1
-0.6837) × (NEFGt
0.9116)
NEFGt ≤ 0S W G t 0
33 SBWt SBWt-1 + SWGt
34 EWGt 0.956 × SWGt
35 PIGt 0.254 - 0.0271 ×(NEFGt/EWGt)
36 FIGt  0.123 ×(NEFGt/EWGt) - 0.154
37 t = 0 EBFt (0.00054 × EBWt
2 + 0.037 × EBWt - 0.61) × 0.85
t > 0 EBFt EBFt-1 + FIGt × EWGt × 0.85
38 EBFPt 100 × (EBFt/EBWt)
39 CFPt 0.70 + 1.0815 × EBFPt
40 CWt 0.73 × EBWt - 22.22     
41 YGt 0.15 × CFPt - 1.7     
Source: Tedeschi et al. (2004), NRC (2000), Fox et al. (1992), Garrett and Hinman (1969), and  
            Fox and Black (1984). 
1LHS=Left hand side of the equation; 
2RHS= Right hand side of the equation
  44 Appendix Table 3 presents summary statistics of major variables in the retained data set 
of 1131 observations. 
The TCSCF data, however, does not provide any information about the 
production technology, inputs, and management practices adopted by the feedlots for 
feeding the steers. In particular, information about the composition and energy and 
protein values of feed, daily dry matter intake by the animals, and the use of implants 
and/or feed additives were not reported.
14 Therefore, a set of typical feedlot rations are 
formulated following the reports of several southwestern feedlots and guidelines 
published in various beef cattle research reports and bulletins.  
Based on the report of the survey and information obtained from three commercial 
feedlots in Iowa, 6 strategic rations are formulated assuming a simple feeding program.
15 
Composition of the rations (per kg dry matter) and corresponding net energy and protein 
values are presented in Appendix Table 4. Each of the rations is constituted with four 
ingredients: corn grain, corn silage, alfalfa hay, and soybean meal. Alfalfa hay and 
soybean meal each accounts for 10 percent of the rations. The rest 80 percent of the 
rations are accomplished by corn grain and silage. The rations differ mainly in the 
proportion of grain and silage, and net energy and protein values of the rations change as 
the grain-silage ratio changes. Appendix Table 4 also depicts net energy for maintenance  
                                                 
14 Little information about the feed provided to the cattle is available in the TCSCF Rules and Regulations, 
which states that cattle are fed a warm-up ration for 28 days before placing them on approximately 80 
percent concentrate ration (http://www.ag.iastate.edu/centers/tcscf/rules.htm). It is also mentioned in the 
TCSCF rules and regulation that the cattle are weighed individually at the time of re-implant, which implies 
that a continuous implant strategy was adopted. 
 
15 Although numerous rations could be formulated by changing the grain-silage ration, only a few 
combinations are selected following typical feeding practices of feedlots. In most of the cases feedlot 
operators choose the ratio in a discrete manner. In simple feeding program the ratio remains unchanged 
throughout the feeding period, and in complex feeding program the ratio changes with every fifty or 
hundred pounds of weight gain.  
 
  45Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
All cattle: 1131 observations
Age (days) 217 29 122 217 337
Initial body weight (lb.) 549.16 83.39 272 544 838
Frame score
1 4.69 1.09 0.75 4.74 7.93
Days on Feed 198 23 125 199 266
Final body weight (lb.) 1155.49 88.24 896 1150 1530
Hot carcass weight (lb.) 704.41 59.44 512 702 938
Numerical yield grade
2 2.62 0.58 0.64 2.62 4.51
Numerical quality grade
3 3.41 0.66 1 3 5
October cattle: 523 observations
Age (days) 202 25 134 200 288
Initial body weight (lb.) 525.87 78.46 272 522 820
Frame score
1 4.40 1.08 0.75 4.50 7.24
Days on Feed 204 25 148 205 266
Final body weight (lb.) 1144.98 82.83 896 1144 1530
Hot carcass weight (lb.) 697.26 55.59 527 697 938
Numerical yield grade
2 2.76 0.56 1.05 2.76 4.22
Numerical quality grade
3 3.33 0.63 1 3 5
November cattle: 255 observations
Age (days) 216 21 122 216 276
Initial body weight (lb.) 554.83 79.51 360 554 776
Frame score
1 4.84 0.97 2.01 4.87 7.45
Days on Feed 201 18 133 204 242
Final body weight (lb.) 1153.94 88.71 956 1150 1400
Hot carcass weight (lb.) 691.61 56.47 535 690 865
Numerical yield grade
2 2.39 0.53 0.98 2.35 4.00
Numerical quality grade
3 3.36 0.69 1 3 5
December cattle: 353 observations
Age (days) 241 24 153 243 337
Initial body weight (lb.) 579.55 82.91 392 574 838
Frame score
1 5.02 1.08 2.17 4.91 7.93
Days on Feed 187 20 125 190 239
Final body weight (lb.) 1172.18 93.25 920 1170 1460
Hot carcass weight (lb.) 724.24 62.22 512 725 902
Numerical yield grade
2 2.57 0.58 0.64 2.59 4.51
Numerical quality grade
3 3.56 0.65 1 4 5
Appendix Table 3: Summary statistics of the TCSCF cattle.
1Frame score: 1 to 3=small, 4 to 6 - medium, and 7 to 9=large.
2Numerical yield grade: 1=high, …, 5=low.
3Numerical quality grade: 1=Prime, 2=CAB, 3=Choice, 4=Select, 5=Standard.  
  46and growth, metabolizable energy, and metabolizable protein available from the rations. 
It is evident from Appendix Table 4 that energy and protein value of the ration increases 
with the proportion of grain. 
Appendix Table 4: Energy and protein values of the rations (per kg dry matter).
Composition NEm NEg ME MP
C:Si:A:So
1 Mcal. Mcal. Mcal. gm.
Ration 1 3:5:1:1 1.841 1.204 2.775 105.423
Ration 2 4:4:1:1 1.889 1.246 2.833 109.013
Ration 3 5:4:1:1 1.937 1.288 2.891 112.604
Ration 4 6:2:1:1 1.985 1.330 2.949 116.195
Ration 5 7:1:1:1 2.033 1.372 3.007 119.785
Ration 6 8:0:1:1 2.081 1.414 3.065 123.376
1Corn:Silage:Alfalfa Hay:Soybean Meal  
Three alternative implant strategies are considered along with the 6 ration 
formulas: no implant, moderate implant (estrogen only), and aggressive implant (estrogen 
plus Trenbolone Acetate) strategies.
16 Thus, there are 18 ration-implant combinations 
altogether. Outcomes of these 18 alternative feed-implant strategies are simulated 
assuming typical mid-western and southern Fall-Spring environmental conditions. Last 
30 years’ monthly averages of major weather variables such as temperature, relative 
humidity, hours of sunshine, and wind speed in different cities in the U.S. are obtained 
from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Department of 
Commerce. Appendix Table 5 presents the last thirty years’ monthly average 
temperature, relative humidity, hours of sunshine, and wind speed in Sioux City, Iowa. 
 
                                                 
16 A continuous implant strategy is assumed to be applied throughout the feeding period, i.e., implant at the 
time of placement in the feedlot, and re-implanting after 90 days.  
 
  47Appendix Table 5: Last thirty years'  monthly average weather data (Sioux City, Iowa) .
Temperature  Wind Speed Rel. Humidity Sunshine
oC Km per hour % Hrs.
January -7.44 18.34 74.50 5.42
February -3.83 18.02 75.00 5.88
March 2.50 19.79 73.00 6.56
April 9.72 21.24 67.50 7.82
May 16.22 18.99 69.50 8.85
June 21.39 17.22 72.00 10.05
July 23.67 14.80 75.00 10.77
August 22.28 14.64 78.00 9.45
September 17.28 15.93 75.00 8.25
October 10.44 16.89 70.00 7.25
November 1.56 18.34 74.50 5.10
December -5.39 17.70 77.00 4.75
Source: NOAA.  
 
The bio-physical growth simulation procedures and results  
Employing the dynamic and deterministic biological growth model and using the 
cattle, nutrient, and weather data as described above, outcomes of feeding the TCSCF 
steers are simulated. Two separate simulations are performed for two alternative terminal 
conditions: feed the cattle until a target finish weight is reached and feed the cattle for a 
predetermined length of the feeding period. Thus, in the first simulation model final 
shrunk body weight is an exogenous variable, while in the second model total days on 
feed is given. Other common independent variables in the growth simulation models are 
age, initial shrunk body weight, breed, frame score, body condition score, hair depth, hide 
thickness, and hair coat of the cattle, net and metabolizable energy and protein content of 
the ration, implant factors, and environmental attributes. The TCSCF data do not include 
information about the body condition score, hair depth, hide thickness, and hair coat of 
  48the cattle. Therefore, typical values are assumed for these variables. Specifically, 
following NRC (2000), all feeder steers are assumed to have a moderate body condition 
score of 5, hair depth of 0.5 inches, average hide thickness with hide code 2, and hair coat 
code of 2 (some mud on lower body). Following Tedeschi et al. (2004), it is assumed that 
requirements for minerals, nitrogen, and amino acids are met by the supplied diet. Daily 
dry matter intake, energy required for maintenance, energy available for growth, weight  
Appendix Table 5: Results from simulation model 1 (fixed terminal state) - means across all the cattle
FSBW TSWG TDMI FE DOF ADG CW DP EBFP CFP YG
(lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) % (%) (%)
No Implant
Ration 1 1157 607 5150 8.46 289 2.16 703 60.78 28.61 31.64 3.05
Ration 2 1157 607 4898 8.05 278 2.24 703 60.78 28.71 31.75 3.06
Ration 3 1157 607 4682 7.70 269 2.32 703 60.78 28.80 31.85 3.08
Ration 4 1157 607 4483 7.37 260 2.39 703 60.78 28.89 31.94 3.09
Ration 5 1157 607 4305 7.08 253 2.45 703 60.78 28.96 32.02 3.10
Ration 6 1157 607 4142 6.81 246 2.52 703 60.78 29.03 32.10 3.11
Estrogen Only
Ration 1 1157 607 4432 7.29 228 2.68 703 60.78 27.25 30.17 2.83
Ration 2 1157 607 4245 6.98 221 2.77 703 60.78 27.34 30.26 2.84
Ration 3 1157 607 4074 6.70 214 2.86 703 60.78 27.42 30.35 2.85
Ration 4 1157 607 3916 6.44 208 2.94 703 60.78 27.50 30.44 2.87
Ration 5 1157 607 3771 6.20 203 3.02 703 60.78 27.57 30.51 2.88
Ration 6 1157 607 3638 5.98 198 3.09 703 60.78 27.63 30.58 2.89
Estrogen plus Trenbolone Acetate
Ration 1 1157 607 4076 6.70 201 3.03 703 60.78 25.86 28.67 2.60
Ration 2 1157 607 3904 6.42 195 3.14 703 60.78 25.95 28.76 2.61
Ration 3 1157 607 3747 6.16 189 3.23 703 60.78 26.03 28.85 2.63
Ration 4 1157 607 3602 5.92 184 3.33 703 60.78 26.10 28.93 2.64
Ration 5 1157 607 3469 5.70 179 3.42 703 60.78 26.17 29.00 2.65
Ration 6 1157 607 3346 5.50 175 3.50 703 60.78 26.23 29.07 2.66
 
  49gain, and composition (protein and fat) of the gain are computed step by step for each 
individual animal with each of the eighteen ration-implant strategies. Steps of the 
simulation procedure are described in Appendix 2.  
A brief summary of the simulation outcomes are presented in Appendix Tables 5 
and 6. Appendix Table 5 displays the results of simulation model 1 (with fixed terminal 
state), while Appendix Table 6 shows the results of simulation model 2 (with fixed 
terminal time). Major dependent variables of interest are total amount of feed consumed 
by the cattle, total shrunk weight gain (for simulation model 1), days on feed (for 
simulation model 2), carcass weight or yield, final empty body fat and carcass fat 
percentages, and resulting yield and quality grades. Only the means (across all the cattle) 
of these are presented in the tables.  
According to the growth model, daily dry matter intake increases with the body 
weights of the cattle and the potency of the growth promoting implants, but decreases 
with the net maintenance energy content of feed. Thus, for a target weight gain, total dry 
matter intake is supposed to decrease with the maintenance energy of feed and potency of 
implants. Feed efficiency (pounds of feed consumed per pound of gain), and average 
daily gain are supposed to improve (as a result, required days on feed declines) with the 
energy content of feed and potency of the implant. These predictions are confirmed by 
the values in columns 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Appendix Tables 5. The growth model also 
implies that empty body and carcass fat percentages increases with net energy content of 
feed and decreases as more aggressive implant strategies are adopted. Columns 10 and 11 
of Appendix Tables 5  show that a 10 percentage change in the grain-silage ratio results 
in approximately only 0.10 percentage point change in mean body and carcass fat, while 
  50the change is quite abrupt (at least 1.31 percentage points) for the change in implant 
strategy. Nevertheless, in order to determine the value of the carcass, changes in body 
and carcass fat percentages are translated into numerical yield and quality grades. Since  
yield and quality grades are directly calculated from empty body fat (Tedeschi et al., 
2004) or carcass fat percentages (Fox and Black, 1984), they follow the same patterns as 
of body fat.    
When cattle are fed for a predetermined length of period (fixed terminal period), 
the predictions of the growth model are little different. As usual, with feedlot days fixed,  
total dry matter intake and shrunk weight gain increases with energy content of feed and 
potency of implant. Feed efficiency and average daily gain also improves accordingly.  
Carcass yield follows a similar pattern. However, unlike the case with known harvest 
body weight (simulation model 1), final empty body fat and final carcass fat percentages 
increase with the use of a more aggressive implant strategy. This is because of extra feed 
consumption and weight gain as a result of using growth promoting implant (columns 1, 
2, and 3 of Appendix Tables 6). For the same reason, increments in empty body fat and 
carcass fat for increments in grain-silage ratio in the feed are also higher for model 2 than 
in model 1. 
In order to test if the outcomes of alternative ration-implant strategies are 
different, Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests are performed. Total dry matter 
intake, weight gain, and the composition of gain by each individual animal under any two 
ration formulas (for a given implant strategy) are paired and tested if the difference 
between the matched samples in the vectors from a distribution whose median is zero. 
Similarly, outcomes under alternative implant strategies are paired (keeping the ration 
  51Appendix Table 6: Results from simulation model 2 (fixed terminal time) - means across all the catt
FSBW TSWG TDMI FE DOF ADG CW DP EBFP CFP YG QG
(lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) % (%) (%)
No Implant
Ration 1 994 445 3371 7.60 198 2.25 598 60.1 24.6 27.3 2.4 4.7
Ration 2 1010 461 3360 7.31 198 2.33 608 60.2 25.1 27.8 2.5 4.6
Ration 3 1025 476 3345 7.05 198 2.41 618 60.2 25.5 28.3 2.5 4.4
Ration 4 1038 489 3326 6.82 198 2.48 626 60.3 25.9 28.7 2.6 4.3
Ration 5 1051 502 3302 6.60 198 2.54 635 60.4 26.3 29.2 2.7 4.2
Ration 6 1063 513 3275 6.40 198 2.60 642 60.4 26.7 29.6 2.7 4.0
Estrogen Only
Ration 1 1083 533 3752 7.04 198 2.70 655 60.5 25.5 28.3 2.5 4.4
Ration 2 1101 551 3743 6.80 198 2.79 667 60.6 26.0 28.8 2.6 4.3
Ration 3 1117 568 3728 6.57 198 2.88 678 60.6 26.5 29.3 2.7 4.1
Ration 4 1133 584 3709 6.36 198 2.95 688 60.7 26.9 29.8 2.8 3.9
Ration 5 1147 598 3685 6.17 198 3.03 697 60.7 27.3 30.3 2.8 3.7
Ration 6 1161 611 3656 5.99 198 3.09 706 60.8 27.7 30.7 2.9 3.6
Estrogen plus Trenbolone Acetate
Ration 1 1149 599 4002 6.68 198 3.03 698 60.8 25.7 28.5 2.6 4.4
Ration 2 1169 620 3996 6.45 198 3.13 711 60.8 26.2 29.0 2.7 4.2
Ration 3 1188 638 3984 6.24 198 3.23 723 60.9 26.7 29.5 2.7 4.0
Ration 4 1205 656 3967 6.05 198 3.32 735 61.0 27.1 30.0 2.8 3.8
Ration 5 1221 672 3944 5.87 198 3.40 745 61.0 27.5 30.5 2.9 3.6
Ration 6 1236 687 3917 5.70 198 3.48 755 61.1 27.9 30.9 2.9 3.5  
 
formula fixed) and tested for zero median of the differences. All of the test statistics 
indicate that the null hypothesis could be rejected at any reasonable (e.g., 5%) 
significance level. Thus, the biological growth simulation model adopted in this study 
accounts for the effects of difference in cattle feeding practices. More precisely, the 
model accounts for the fact that energy content of feed and use of any particular implant 
strategy systematically alters yield and quality of beef. 
  52Predictive efficiency of the biological model is evaluated by comparing the 
simulated values of the endogenous variables with actual data provided by the TCSCF. 
As mentioned earlier, the TCSCF data do not include information about the nutrient 
contents of feed and implants actually provided to the cattle. Therefore, simulated carcass 
yield and quality are compared to actual outcomes by matching feedlot days and final 
body weights of each individual animal. It is then checked if the corresponding strategies 
matche with the general TCSCF feeding guidelines. Using a simple search algorithm, 
strategy that corresponds to the nearest neighbor of the actual days on feed (the final 
body weight for model 2) is singled out from the available alternatives. Other relevant 
outcomes of that particular feeding strategy are then separated and saved as the elements 
of a row vector of a two-dimensional matrix. This procedure is repeated for all the cattle 
thus generating a matrix with vectors containing simulated feedlot and carcass data. 
Simulated carcass yield (weight), yield grade, and quality grade are then compared with 
the actual data.  
Several statistical procedures are carried out to test if the simulated data are 
statistically similar to the actual data. Three non-parametric tests are performed on each 
set of carcass weight, yield grade, and quality grade data: Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-rank test, Mann-Whitney U test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test), and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) test. Results of these tests are depicted in Appendix Table 7. Resulting P-
values of all three of the non-parametric tests indicate that the null hypothesis for carcass 
weight cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level, but the null hypotheses for 
yield grade and quality grade can not be hold for the pulled sample.
17 In order to check if 
                                                 
17 It should be mentioned that quality grade data are ordinal in nature, while the parametric tests assume 
that the variables are continuously distributed.  
  53the performance of the simulation model varies according to the feedlot placement 
month, same procedures are carried with the disaggregated data. Test results show that 
the model performs better with October cattle data. In particular, the null hypotheses of 
the signed-rank and rank-sum tests for yield grade also become valid when tested with 
October cattle data. However, none of the null hypotheses hold when tested with 
December cattle data.  
 
  54Appendix Table 7: Results of the tests of hypotheses of similarity between 
                actual and simulated outcomes from model 1.
Signed-rank test Rank-sum test K-S test
All cattle
    Carcass weight H=0 H=0 H=0
P=0.053 P=0.51 P=0.51
    Yield grade H=1 H=1 H=1
P=0.001 P=0.001 P=0.001
    Quality grade H=1 H=1 H=1
P=0.001 P=0.001 P=0.001
October cattle
    Carcass weight H=0 H=0 H=0
P=0.27 P=0.72 P=0.73
    Yield grade H=0 H=0 H=1
P=0.93 P=0.84 P=0.000
    Quality grade H=1 H=1 H=1
P=0.001 P=0.001 P=0.001
November cattle
    Carcass weight H=1 H=0 H=0
P=0.04 P=0.07 P=0.24
    Yield grade H=1 H=1 H=1
P=0.001 P=0.001 P=0.001
    Quality grade H=1 H=1 H=1
P=0.001 P=0.001 P=0.001
December cattle
    Carcass weight H=1 H=1 H=1
P=0.001 P=0.014 P=0.03
    Yield grade H=1 H=1 H=1
P=0.001 P=0.001 P=0.001
    Quality grade H=1 H=1 H=1
P=0.001 P=0.001 P=0.001   
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